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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we examine the relationship between intemational trade 
and environmental policies in the context of a regional trading 
agreement, with special reference to the North Amencan Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Our interest was sparked by the renowned trade 
conflict on tuna between Mexico and the United States in which the 
TJs used trade policy (an embargo on imports of tuna) in order to pursue 
an environmental goal (the protection of dolphins, that are frequently 
caught and die in the nets of Mexican tuna fishermen). This bilateral 
dispute highlighted some of the inadequacies of the current multilateral 
trading system in dealing with environmental problems; indicating 
that, in the absence of a significant change in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), some other mechanism is needed in 
order to resolve disagreements over environmental issues. 
Two additional elements of the tuna dispute were of particular 
interest to U.S. in relation to regional trading agreements such as the 
NAFTA. The first of these is the observation that countries at different 
stages of development seem to have different degrees of concem as 
to the harmful environmentai consequences of their productive 
activities, while the second is the use of international trade policy as 
a means of controlling environmental problems. 
There are many explanations for the relative laxness of pollution 
standards in developing countries, one of the more comrnon beíng that 
a clean environment is a luxury good that the poor nations can ill afford. 
Whatever the reason, casual empiricism indicates that similar 
industries are "dirtier" in developing countries than in the industrialized 
world. This raises an interesting question in terms of economic 
integration in North America. While the initial agreement between 
Canada and the U.S. was one between rich countries at similar stages 
of development (which has also been largely the case for European 
integrationlthe proposed NAFTA involves the creation of a free-trade 
area encompassing rich and poor nations. Regional trading agreements 
composed of fairly homogeneous countnes most likely generate few 
environmental problems, in that the participating countries will have 
been pursuing similar pollution policies índependently. Indeed, 
integration may perrnit the members to harmonize their environmental 
policies to a greater degree than previously possible. But if the member 
countries have markedly different incomes, as have the U.S. and 
Mexico, their tolerances for pollution may widely differ. Consequently 
the increased volume of trade that will result from the NAFTA may 
then be accompanied by deleterious effects on the environment as a 
direct consequence of the deal. The prospect of this led to vigorous 
carnpaigning by environmental groups in the U.S. and Canada against 
the NAFTA, or at least in favour of a parallel accord on environmental 
issues. The Clinton Administration successfully negotiated a side 
agreement on the environment (as well as one on labour issues) 
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without which, it was argued, the NAFTA could not have received 
congressional approval." Irnmediately following the signing of the 
environmental side agreement, several of the major envi 
ronmental lobbying groups endorsed the NAFTA as being beneficial 
to the environment. This side agreement may have allayed fears of 
pollution sufficiently to ensure NAFTA'S passage through Congress. 
Dealing with pollution that occurs outwith a country's frontiers is 
generally difficult, if not impossible. Clearly, the country does not have 
the jurisdiction to impose controls on activities taking place in another 
nation. However, should some of the products made by the polluting 
industries be sold on international markets, then foreign countries may 
be able to use trade policy as a means of limiting the environmental 
darnage. Thus, a country could impose restrictions on the 
environmental characteristics of goods sold on its markets, even if 
these goods are manufactured abroad. Consequently, the country would 
be subjecting imported goods to its domestic laws. The more important 
is an importing country's market to the polluting industry, the more 
effective its trade policy will be. Thus the U.S. was able to control 
the destruction of dolphins by its embargo on canned tuna that was 
caught by methods that endangered the mamrnals, using a trade 
restriction to ensure that al1 tuna on the American market was "dolphin 
free". Free trade in North America will prevent countries from 
exercising such (indirect) controls on foreign pollution, but the 
increased cooperation between countries inherent in regional 
integration opens up the possibility of findlng ways to resolve this 
1) -These agreements are entitled the "North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation" (hereafter temed the "side agreement") and the "North American 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation" [Govemment of Canada (1993a and 1993b, 
respectively)l, signed on 14 September 1993. 
problem of extrajurisdictionality, the application of domestic laws to 
activities occurring outside one's country.'' 
Because of this interaction between trade and environmental policies, 
the goal of our research has been to illustrate the importante of 
enacting parallel rather than sequential agreements on the two issues 
in North America. We have taken up this task in a series of analytic 
papers [Ludema and Wooton (1992 and 199311. These are theoretical 
explorations of the relationship between international trade and 
environmental policies. As far as we are aware, the questions that we 
raise have not been previously addressed in the international trade 
literature. The current paper presents a more policy-oriented analysis 
of the implications of North American regional integration for the 
environmental well-being of the continent, examining the instrurnents 
and options available to control pollution while markets are being 
opened up to continental competition. 
In Section 11 we separate out those environmental problems of 
especial relevance to regional integration. The inability of importing 
countries to impose environmental controls on foreign goods leads us 
to consider the potential use of trade restrictions as environmental 
controls in Section IIí. We discuss the constraints on such unilateral 
action arising from membership of the GATT and briefly consider how 
the articles of the GATT might have been amended in the Uruguay 
Round in order to perrnit trade restrictions for environmental purposes. 
In Section IV we examine cooperative, comprehensive agreements on 
trade and environmental issues. The goal of such agreements is to 
balance the goals of more open international markets with effective 
environmental management; but national arnbitions may pervert the 
2) See Charnovitz (1992) for the distinction between "extraterritorial" and 
"extrajurisdictional." 
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outcome. We then look at the NAFTA and its environments side 
agreement to determine whether the goal has been accomplished. 
Section V considers how the Multilateral Trade Organization, MTO, 
the successor to CATT and a forum purely for the establishment of 
trade policy, might yet serve a role in influencing multilateral 
environmental policies. 
11. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS BEING ADDRESSED 
Part of the difficulty in navigating through the ocean of literature 
on intemational trade and environmental economics is that there are 
several types of environmental problems, each of which demands a 
different type of remedy. Only in certain instances will that remedy 
involve changes in trade policy. 
At one end of the spectrum are, what we shall call, local pollution 
problems. These involve the degradation of the environment in the 
immediate vicinity of the consurnption or production activity, affecting 
only the local comrnunity and having no spillovers to other countries. 
This environmental damage may range from the purely aesthetic (for 
example, the construction of a spectacularly ugly factory building or 
shopping mall) to life-threatening (the contamination of local ground 
water). The crucial aspect of this category is that this pollution does 
not have any intemational consequences: neither does the pollution 
itself have an impact on citizens of other countries; nor does the use 
of dirty production processes confer a competitive advantage to 
producers with respect to foreign firms. The environmental problems 
are caused by and affect only the local population and consequently 
the solutions are purely local, with no role for any intemational policy. 
In complete contrast are problems of the global commons type, in 
which the actions of every country have a direct impact on al1 nations. 
The emissions of greenhouse gases and the atmospheric release of 
CFCS clearly fa11 into this category. Such problems require global 
solutions, cooperative agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. While 
international trade policy rnight be used in order to reward participation 
in such an agreement, and punish non- performance, there need be 
no direct link between the cause of the pollution and the volurne of 
international trade. 
Between these categories lies the type of problem with which we 
are concerned and which, we believe, is of especial importante to 
questions of regional integration. In this case, the pollution arises in 
the manufacture of goods, a significant proportion of which are for 
export. The pollution may directly affect citizens in the importing 
country (for exarnple, the pollution of rivers on the border between 
the U.S. and Mexico) or it may be just that the knowledge of the 
environmental degradation Iowers their welfare (as in the tunaldolphin 
case)." In any event, there is a clear link between trade and the 
environment. Consequently, efforts at trade liberalization (as in 
regional integration) are likely to have implications for pollution levels 
in the region. We categorize these environmental problems as 
cross-border externalities. These environmental problems are more 
likely to occur between countries that are in close geographic proximity 
to one another, precisely the countries who have historically pursued 
preferential trade agreements (for exarnple, NAFTA and the EC in their 
respective eponymous continents). Thus, as our title indicates, our 
concem is primarily with continental trade and environmental issues. 
3) Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) cal1 the former "physical" and the latter 
"psychological" spillovers. 
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II .l Correcting for Environmental Extemalities 
An environmental externality involves a market failure, in the sense 
that the producer does not take into account the full costs of production 
of the good, as he is not required to pay for the emissions of pollutants 
arising from the production process. An effective way in which a 
govemment can affect the behaviour of its own firms is to tax the 
levels of pollution through an externality tax. This has the effect of 
raising the costs of "dirtier" producers more than those of relatively 
"'cleaner" producers, while encouraging al1 firms to adopt less polluting 
te~hniques.~' Such an extemality tax embodies the polluter pays 
principle, PPP, where the creator of a negative externality is forced 
to pay for it.=' 
When the good is traded, the importing country clearly cannot 
directly enforce the PPP. It must either reach an agreement with the 
exporting country that the latter implement an externality tax, or it 
could pay the foreign producers to use cleaner techniques (in which 
case, we have the victim pays principle, VPP, in operation), or it can 
unilaterally adopt some less direct policy that will, at least to some 
degree, control the foreign pollution. The first of these policies (and, 
perhaps, the second) might be part of a regional trade agreement. 
Attempts to use the last of these options may be seen to be at odds 
with a country's GATT obligations; as may be illustrated by the 
tunddolphin dispute between the U.S. and Mexico. 
4) In contrast, a production tax will treat al1 producers equally and will only reduce 
the levels of goods production, not the method of production. 
5) For more on this, see Blackhurst and Subrarnanian (1992). 
Article 1 of the GATT establishes the pnnciple of Most- 
Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment, whereby a country may not 
discriminate between "like" products imported from other contracting 
parties to the GATT. The characteristics of final products, and not 
the means by which they are made, determine whether or not they 
are alike. Thus, however tuna is caught, whether or not dolphins are 
killed in the process, has no beanng on the final product and therefore 
the U.S. was in violation of its GATT obligations in imposing the 
restriction on imports from Mexico. The U.S. argued that its application 
of the Marine Mammals Protection Act, 1972 was within the scope 
of Article XX (General Exceptions). The GATT panel on the 
tuna/dolphin case disagreed, rejecting this extrajurisdictional 
application of Articles xx(b) and xx(g), exemptions for "measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" and 
"measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
if such measures are to be made in conjunction with restnctions on 
domestic production and consumption," respectively.') Thus any 
measures that attempt to restrict trade based on arguments about 
environmental damage occurring in other countries are considered to 
be inconsistent with the GATT. 
Countries that wish to influence other countries' environmental 
policies have two possible avenues within the GATT: they could 
attempt to build a consensus amongst the contracting parties such that 
the existing Article xx be interpreted differently and 
extrajurisdictional measures be considered acceptable; or they rnight 
seek a change in the GATT rules themselves. The latter objective, 
6) Details of the findings of the GATT panel on the tuna/dolphin case are in Charnovitz 
(1992) while a general discussion of the relationship between the GATT and 
environmental objectives is in Arden-Clarke (1991). 
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the use of trade restrictions for environmental purposes, might be 
realised through the widening of Article vi to recognize extemalized 
environmental costs as an inadmissible subsidy [Arden-Clarke (1991)l. 
In other words, a country that does not subject its producers to as 
stringent environmental standards as its trading partners would be 
deemed to be giving its firms an unfair subsidy. Unless the offending 
producers were forced to clean up, contracting parties to the GATT 
would be perrnitted to retaliate. Thus firms would be forced to 
intemalize their pollution, ailowing an intemational application of the 
PPP. However, such an amendment to the code on subsidies was not 
part of the Final Act of the GATT's Uruguay Round. 
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round [GATT (1993)l does introduce 
a restriction on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in which the least 
trade restrictive measures be imposed to achieve, arnong other things, 
environmental objectives. Thus, Article 2.2 states: 
"Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. Por this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives 
are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive 
practices; protection of hurnan health or safety, animal plant life or health, 
or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter ulia, available scientific and technical information, 
related processing technology or intended end uses of products." 
As we discuss, below, the least trade restrictive environmental 
measure may not be the most efficient instrument to achieve econornic 
efficiency . 
III. POLICY OPTIONS WITHOUT FULL COOPERATION 
It is generally accepted that, in a very loose sense, more trade is 
better than less. International trade permits countries to specialize in 
the production of those goods in which they have comparative 
advantages, while their consumers have access to the full spectrum 
of goods on the international market. Consequently, the thrust of 
international trade negotiations over the past half century has been 
the tearing down of formal trade baniers, with the presumption that 
this will increase aggregate welfare. Of course, it has long been 
recognized that these gains will not benefit al1 countries equally (hence 
the need for negotiations) and that, in the presence of other market 
distortions, the gains rnay in fact not materialize and there rnay indeed 
be aggregate losses (the familiar second-best argument). 
While the latter aspect is often given short shrift in policy circles, 
it rnay be particularly relevant when production externalities are 
present. Increased trade volumes rnay reflect increased production by 
polluting industries, and the consequential environmental damage rnay 
outweigh any trade gains.7' In other words, trade liberalization rnay 
move the countries from one sub-optimal situation to another. Thus, 
if trade reform is to be a goal, it rnay have to be accompanied by policies 
to deal with pollution. 
The remaining question is then, how can the best mixture of policies 
be arranged? Must there be an agreement for everything, or can 
7) Of course, the reverse rnight also hold h e :  it rnay be that the new location of 
~roduction uses cleaner techniques than those in the importing country (for example, 
if hydro-electricity were used instead of power from fossil fuels) and so, despite 
the higher production levels, the aggregate pollution rnight decline. For an 
assessment of the likelihood of this, see Grossman and Krueger (1991). 
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countries be allowed discretion over certain types of policies? Let us 
begin to answer these questions by examining the implications of 
discretion. 
m.1. The Trouble with Tariffs 
One approach to dealing with the problem of cross-border 
externalities is to restrict trade, through the use of tariffs or equivalent 
instruments. There are severa1 problems with this approach. For one, 
if the country imposing the tariff accounts for only a small portion 
of the total demand for the polluting firms' product, the policy may 
be ineffective. The firms will just export to other countries without 
substantially reducing production. Consequently, the importing country 
has only a marginal effect on aggregate pollution levels, while having 
to substitute more expensive domestic goods for what it previously 
had imported. If several countries export the sarne good, but with 
different levels of the externality, the importing country's 
environmental policy may do nothing other than ensure that it gets 
the "cleaner" imports, while other importers that do not care to the 
sarne degree get the "dirty" goods. 
The ability of governments to effectively control a cross-border 
externality through the use of trade policy depends on their having 
an ability to affect the prices received by firms; that is, the countries 
must be large. Only in these circumstances will firms change their 
behaviour in response to policies set in their export markets. 
Unfortunately, this is precisely the situation in which the importing 
country would wish to improve its terms of trade by restricting trade. 
Thus, allowing an importing country, large enough to affect world 
pnces, to use tariffs freely for environmental purposes would most 
likely lead to an over-restriction of trade. It should also be borne in 
mind that, if the exporting country is similarly empowered, it might 
wish to tax its exports for the same reason. Worse yet, the protectionist 
intent of these policies will be obscured behind a veil of 
environmentalist rhetoric. 
Another drawback to using a tariff for environmental purposes is 
that it is too blunt a policy instrument. If there is technology available 
to the polluting firms that can control the arnount of pollution created 
in the production process, then taxing the production of the good would 
not induce the firms to adopt this technology. The first-best policy 
in this instance is a tax applied directly to the pollution itself, for this 
would induce firms to economize on pollution-generating activities. A 
tax on production is second-best and a trade tax, to the extent that 
it taxes only the traded portion of the firms' total production, would 
be worse." 
For the remaining analytical discussions in this paper, we shall 
assume that there are only two countries in the world (in order to avoid 
the problems of substitution of dirty imports with clean imports from 
a third country) and, consequently, that these countries are both large 
(in the sense of their both having monopoly power in trade). In order 
to consider the issues at their most extreme, we further assurne that 
the government in the exporting country (reflecting the preferences 
of its citizens) does not care about the pollution that is created and 
hence only the importing country considers using environmental 
policies for the sake of controlling ernissions. Any domestic production 
in the importing country is assurned to be already subject to the 
- -- 
8) If, however, the externality is prduced in fixed proportions with output of the good 
(that is, there is no abatement technology), then a prduction tax would be 
equivalent to a pollution tax. 
CONTINENTAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLlCY 129 
appropriate domestic pollution policies. We shall then modify these 
assumptions in the application of our results to the NAFTA nations. 
111. 2. Free Trade with Discretionary Environmental Polices 
Now consider environmental policies when these are being used in 
a region; that is, where the countries have a free-trade agreement, 
or are simultaneously introducing one. Given the (assumed) 
asymrnetry between the partners in the region (with respect to their 
degrees of development, income, etc.), it is natural to ask why they 
should consider establishing a regional agreement. There are 
undoubtedly convincing political arguments that could be made for 
each specific region, but it is harder to find economic justifications for 
trade agreements between differently sized countries, as the smaller 
country will receive the lion's share of the benefits of trade 
liberalization." It is conceivable that a regional trade agreement might 
be a quid-pro-quo incentive for pollution abatement. That is, small 
countries agree to clean up their production in return for access to the 
larger countries' markets. 
The imposition of free trade between the two countries drastically 
diminishes, but does not deplete, the arsenal of instruments for 
conducting their trade war.lO' In particular, the exporting country still 
retains the possibility of setting an externality tax. Such a tax raises 
the private costs of production, both through inducing costly abatement 
9) This is the standard optimal-tariff argument. A small country's welfare is 
maxirnized by multilateral free trade, while large countries benefit from trade 
restrictions that manipulate the terms of trade in their favour. 
10) As a production tax acts in exactly the sarne way as trade taxes, we assurne that 
it is also prohibited. In the absence of third countries, a free-trade agreement is 
the same as a customs union. or indeed multilateral trade liberalization. 
methods and through the tax levied on the remaining pollution that 
is produced. As a result, industrial supply will shift back, reducing the 
equilibrium output and increasing the consumer price. Thus the 
exporter can improve its terms of trade, albeit imperfectly. The best 
instnunent for this purpose, the export tax, is unavailable and so the 
externality tax is a second-best policy. Its inferiority to a trade 
restriction is precisely because it has induced the abatement 
expenditures, from which its citizens derive no benefit. However, the 
offsetting advantage to the exporting country of being part of the 
region is that the importing country is unable to retaliate, as the latter 
has negotiated away its right to use a tariff and has no means of 
restricting pollution levels. It is an empirical question whether the 
pollution tax is a good thing in this setting. The exporter is using it 
for his own selfish reasons but, in the process, the good is being 
produced in a less environmentally damaging way. So the possibility 
arises that both countries in the region may be better off from the use 
of the extemality tax, despite the tax rate being set non-cooperatively. 
While the free trade agreement may have stripped the importing 
country of its tariffs, an alternative policy instntment rnight be a 
process standard, a constraint on the means of manufacture, such that 
a good that is produced by clean techniques could be traded freely, 
while one whose production resulted in excessive pollution would face 
an embargo. While product standards abound, for varying health and 
safety reasons, they are not the same as process standards. Product 
standards are effective in controlling consumption extemalities (for 
example, lirniting the ernissions by automobiles) and they are 
permissible under the GATT."' However, they are controls on the final 
11) The "Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade" [CATT, (1993, II.611 states that 
"no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the 
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characteristics of a good, not on the means by which it was made. 
Thus a product standard could not force a manufacturer to change the 
methods by which a good is made, which is what is needed in order 
to lirnit production externalities. In order to differentiate between 
production technologies, a process standard that dictates or proscribes 
certain production techniques would have to be introduced. 
Strictly speaking, as we pointed out in our discussion of the 
tuna/dolphin case, process standards violate Article 1 of the GATT, 
which insists that like goods must be treated identically. Yet several 
European countries have discussed the introduction of process 
standards on imports, despite their contravention of the trade rules. 
The wisdom of the GATT code is that while a process standard can 
be an effective instrument for environmental policy, it could equally 
be a powerfully protectionist instrument. If the process standard is set 
at a high level, in the sense that a substantial arnount of pollution is 
permitted in production, then the standard win restrict only the dirtiest 
of firms. As an environmental tool it is therefore quite effective, in 
clearing out the worst offenders, but would be fairly innocuous for trade 
policy. As the standard becomes more stringent, relatively cleaner 
production processes are caught and forced to clean up further, and 
the trade regime becomes more restrictive. 
It is claimed by some advocates for the developing world that process 
standards that are established to reflect the production techniques of 
the industrialized world are biased against the developing countries, 
which are using more primitive (and, generally, dirtier) methods. 
Hence, it is argued that the appropriate standards that should be set 
quality of C..] the environrnent [ ... 1 at the levels it considers appropnate, subject 
to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a disguised restriction on intemational trade L... 1." 
for developing countries should reflect their levels of industrialization, 
particularly since the industrialized countries faced no such 
environmental impediments themselves during their development. Of 
course, the generous application of these differential process standards 
would limit their effectiveness. 
Interestingly, the process standard, while protectionist enough on its 
own, also removes the primary drawback for the exporter of using an 
extemality tax as a trade instrurnent. If the process standard is binding, 
then a marginal increase in the extemality tax will not induce firms 
to further abate pollution. Effectively, the process standard tums the 
extemality tax into a straight production tax or, if the extemality tax 
is applied only to goods destined for export, into a export tax. This 
is contrary to intent of the free trade agreement and limits its 
effectiveness. 
IU.3. The Environmental Rovisions of the NAFTA 
When the NAFTA was negotiated, it was as a stand-alone, free-trade 
agreement with some references to environmental policies. It was only 
later that a side agreement on the environment (as well as one on labour 
standards) was added; al1 of which were irnplemented simultaneously. 
Thus, we shall first look at the environmental aspects of the original 
NAFTA treaty; that is the possible consequences of the implementation 
of this free-trade agreement had the partner countries been free to pursue 
independent (discretionary) environmental policies. We leave the 
discussion of the NAFTA cum environmental side agreement to Section 
IV, the analysis of comprehensive (trade and environmental) 
intemational cooperation. Table 1 provides a synopsis of the 
environmental provisions the NAFTA. 
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Table 1 
Sumrnary of the environmental 
provisions of the NAFTA 
(a) The trade obligations of the NAFTA countries under specified 
international environmental agreements regarding endangered species, 
ozone-depleting substances and hazardous wastes will take precedence 
over NAFTA provisions, subject to a requirement to minirnize 
inconsistency with the NAFTA. This ensures that the NAFTA will not 
diminish a country's right to take action under these environmental 
agreements. 
(b) The Agreement affirms the right of each country to choose the 
level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health or of 
environmental protection that it considers appropriate. 
(c) NAFTA also makes clear that each country may maintain and adopt 
standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, including those 
more stringent than international standards, to secure its chosen level 
of protection. 
(d) The NAFTA countries will work jointly to enhance the protection 
of human, animal and plant life and health and the environment. 
(e) The Agreement provides that no NAFTA country should lower 
its health, safety or environmental standards for the purpose of attracting 
investment. 
(f) When a dispute regarding a country's standards raises factual 
issues concerning the environment, that country may choose to have the 
dispute submitted to NAFTA dispute settlement procedures rather than 
under the procedures of other trade agreements. This same option is 
available for disputes concerning trade measures under specified 
international environmental agreements. 
(g) NAFTA dispute settlement panels may cal1 on experts, to provide 
advice on factual questions related to the environment and other scientific 
matters. 
(h) In dispute settlement, the complaining country bears the burden 
of proving that another NAFTA country's environmental or health 
measure is inconsistent with the NAFTA. 
SOURCE: Government of Canada (1992) 
A 
A primary concern of our anaiysis in the preceding section was that 
the exporting counhy might attempt to exercise its monopoly power 
in trade by imposing extemality taxes. Given the enormous differences 
in the sizes of the economies of the three parties in NAFTA, it is 
unlikely that the two smaller nations have a strong terms-of-trade 
influence for many commodities.12' This will be especially the case 
for Mexico. So we shall ignore the scenario of Mexico applying higher 
environmental standards than it would otherwise impose just to raise 
intemational prices for its exports. In fact the concem expressed by 
labour groups in Canada and the U.S. was that Mexico might adopt 
lower environmental standards specificaily so as to lure investment 
away from countries with strong pollution controls. Clause (e )  of Table 
1 reflects an attempt to address this concem and is embodied in the 
NAFTA treaty as Article 1114, part 2, stating that: 
%)he Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by relaxing domestic heaith, safety or environrnentai measures. Accordingly, 
a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion or retention in its temtory of an investrnent of an 
investor. [ ... 1" 
Article 1114 is designed to prevent countries from providing 
production subsidies to firms, in that the pollution costs of their 
production would not have to be fully internali~ed.'~' Just how important 
12) The Gross Domestic Products of the three countries were (in billions of U.S. Dollars 
at 1985 prices): Canada, 430; Mexico, 17; and the us, 4,645. 
13) However there seem to be few teeth to the requirement. The article concludes with 
the statement that "(i)f a Party considers that another Party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two 
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement." The side 
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differences in environmental laws are for firms' choices of investment 
locations is an unresolved question; opponents to the NAFTA placed 
a great deal of emphasis on this aspect of the deal, while some studies 
indicate that lax environmental standards account for only a small 
component of the industrial location decision Csee Low and Yeats 
(199211. 
Our preceding analysis also indicated that the importing country 
might seek to use environmental policy in its imports both for the 
legitimate reason of limiting pollution but also as a means for it to 
exploit its monopoly power in trade. Given the dominant position held 
by the U.S. in Mexico's export markets, this latter purpose cannot 
easily be discounted. 
A process standard is desirable to import-competing firms because, 
like a tariff, it raises the cost of imported products. So we should expect 
to see governments in a free-trade agreement, like NAFTA, being 
lobbied for process standards in much the same way they would 
othenvise be have been lobbied to impose tariffs. 
From the standpoint of the welfare of the importing country, the 
process standard has the sarne desirable effect as the tariff of inducing 
pollution abatement in the exporting country, but has the disadvantage 
of generating no tax revenues. This shortcoming means that only a 
country that truly cares about the environment would impose a process 
standard on welfare grounds alone; a country that is not 
environmentally conscious would reduce its welfare through the use 
of a process standard, but might still use one if it succurnbed to political 
pressure from its import-competing industry. 
- 
agreement on the environment charges the Council of the newly formed Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation to provide assistance to the Parties in consultations 
under Article 1114. 
In terms of world welfare, a drawback of the process standard is 
that it does not lead firms to internalize the social costs of their pollution 
sufficiently, unless the process standard is augmented with a 
production tax of some sort. To see this, compare a process standard 
with the optimal pollution tax. Under the pollution tax, firms pay not 
only a production cost per unit of output, due to the expensive 
pollution-abatement technology they have been forced to adopt, but 
they also pay a tax levy on whatever pollution they do not abate. Under 
a process standard, the firms pay the costs of pollution abatement, 
sufficient to satisfy the standard, but escape the tax. Thus a process 
standard that induces firms to produce the correct arnount of pollution 
per unit of output will lead to over-production, and a standard that 
is tight enough to eliminate the over-production will unduly constrain 
pollution per unit of output. Either way the process standard misses 
the mark. 
When imposed unilaterally by the importing country (as would 
happen in the absence of a side agreement), the process standard will 
always e n  in the direction of unduly constraining pollution per unit 
of output. This is because the benefit from reducing pollution per unit 
of output accrues to the importing country, while the cost of abatement 
is shared between importing consumers and exporting producers. Thus 
the smaller the Mexican share of the U.S. market, the more the burden 
would be borne by the Mexican producers and the tighter the process 
standard would become. 
IV. FULL COOPERATION WITHOUT FULL INFORMATION 
Once countries agree to cooperate on resolving cross-border 
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environmental problems, it might seem that the solution is simple: the 
implementation of the externality tax that would have been imposed 
had the region been a single country. However there may yet be forces 
militating against the use of this apparently ideal policy, in favour of 
more expedient ones. It is often argued that the high costs of 
administering environmental standards makes them unlikely to be 
enforced, particularly in developing countries. Establishing and 
maintaining a system of on-site inspection and monitoring of 
production facilities can be very expensive, and there may be 
difficulties in keeping such a system both independent of political forces 
and free of corruption. If these administrative costs are sufficiently 
high, it would be better to impose a less direct, but more cheaply 
enforced, poli~y.14' This is recognized by the World Bank (1992, 78) 
in the following statement. 
"Ideally, regulators would attempt to change the behavior of resource 
users by means of direct policies-for instante, by taxing or regulating 
ernissions. But these measures involve a heavy administrative burden 
because they target individual polluters or resource users. Blunt policies, such 
as taxes on polluting inputs are less demanding because they can be 
implemented through the tax system. [ ... 1 So in many cases it will be 
appropriate that developing countries use blunt policies, which require less 
stringent monitoring." 
Even if the efficiency gains of externality taxes outweigh their 
administrative costs, exporting countries will face the burden of the 
14) T h s  is a similar argument to that for the use of tariffs for revenue generation 
in developing countries; while tariffs induce distortions that rnay not arise with 
domestic taxation instruments, the costs of counting imports at a lirnited number 
of entry points may be much less than the expense of admuiistering, say, a 
value-added tax or an income tax. 
latter while not receiving many benefits from the former. So their best 
private option might be to minirnize their costs by not enforcing any 
pollution policies. Thus countries may ostensibly have very restrictive 
controls on pollution but effectively have none, due to lack of 
enforcement. 
If the region in question is comprised of both developing and 
industrialized nations then there is the opportunity for the latter to 
compensate the forrner for their monitoring and enforcement costs. But 
this opens up an aspect of another problem: both the costs of pollution 
abatement and the environmental darnage itself are difficult to measure 
and prone to misrepresentation. This makes it harder to determine the 
appropriate means of controlling the pollution and complicates the 
negotiations as to the transfers necessary to compensate countries that 
bear a disproportionate burden. This aspect is also addressed by the 
World Bank (1992, 155-6). 
"The potential partners to an intemational environmental agreement 
rarely stand to gain or lose equally from it. If an agreement is to work, either 
it must lead to efficiency gains sufficiently large that aii parties can expect 
to be better off (whích rarely happens) or countries must be willing to 
negotiate transfers to assist those who wiíl lose, [ ... 1 Arranging for such 
transfers will not be simple. The potential parties to an agreement rnay not 
share a cornmon view of the urgency of the problem or of the possible 
solutions. It is extremely difficult to ensure that countries are paid neither 
more nor less than the extra costs of meeting their international obligations. 
Every country has incentives to distort the costs or benefits of taking action." 
Negotiations between countries must therefore have two distinct 
goals: detennining, on the bases of relative costs and aggregate 
benefits, what type of environmental policy should be used; and 
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resolving, on the basis of the distribution of benefits between the 
countries, who should pay for the abatement program (that is, whether 
PPP is maintained or if instead VPP should be adopted, where the 
consurner pays). Our second paper [Ludema and Wooton (1993)l has 
addressed these issues in a formal model. We provide here a synopsis 
of our results. 
Let us add to our model the assumption that there is an 
administrative cost to enforcing an externality tax, while production 
or trade taxes are assurned to remain costless to implement.15) Suppose 
also that the true leve1 of this administrative cost is known only by 
the exporting country, while the importing country has private 
information as to the strength of the environmental sentirnents among 
its cons~mers.'~' There are two questions we wish to answer about 
cooperation between these two countries on trade and environmental 
policy . First, what are the characteristics of an ideal ( first-best) 
cooperative environmental policy and, second, what type of policy is 
likely to arise out of bilateral negotiations? 
To answer these questions it is useful to think of a policy agreement 
as a contract, which requires the exporting country to report its 
adrninistrative cost and specifies the appropriate policies and 
compensation for each possible report. Thus, for example, the contract 
would specify that report by the exporting country that of its 
adrninistrative costs will lead to the choice of a particular pollution 
15) We refer to this as an administrative cost, although any sunk cost borne by the 
exporting country, and associated with reducing the externality per unit of output, 
win do. While there rnay be administrative costs associated with production or trade 
taxes, if they are lower than those of the extmahty tax, no generality is lost in 
ignoring them. 
16) As in the original paper, this summary will focus on the administrative cost being 
private information. 
policy, with a corresponding transfer being made by the importing 
country to the exporter.17' Borrowing terrninology from contract theory, 
we say that a contract is incentive compatible if the exporter can do 
no better than honestly report the level of its administrative costs; a 
contract is individually rational if both countries expect to do better 
under the contract (before hearing the exporter's report) than by not 
cooperating at all; and a contract is (ex-post) efficient if the appropriate 
policy is selected, given the costs of enforcing an externality tax. An 
optimal contract satisfies al1 three of these conditions. 
While our previous discussion showed a production/trade tax to be 
clearly inferior to a pollution tax, this ranking may now be reversed 
if the costs of administeríng the pollution tax are high enough. In 
particular, compare the aggregate social welfare of the two countnes 
(before subtracting administrative costs) from using the extemality tax 
set at the appropriate level to that from using a productiodtrade tax 
set at the (second-best) optimal level. The difference is the efficiency 
gain from using the externality tax. Now an efficient policy agreement 
would employ the productiodtrade tax whenever the adrninistrative 
cost is greater than the efficiency gain from the externality tax and 
would employ the externality tax otherwise. 
Thus the choice of the best pollution-control instrument (externality 
tax or tariff) is quite straightfonvard, but it is more complicated to 
elicit a truthful report of the adrninistrative cost of an externality tax. 
For example, imagine that the importer agreed to exactly compensate 
the exporter for its adrninistrative costs. In that case the exporter would 
17) The transfer may be monetary or, in the case of a comprehensive agreement on 
trade and the environment, the transfer might instead take the form of trade 
concessions; that is, the exporter is rewarded with increased gains from trade for 
having enforced its environmental laws. 
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have an incentive to over- state this cost. It turns out that the optimal 
contract has a very simple structure: whenever the exporter reports 
its administrative cost to be less than the efficiency gain from using 
the externality tax, then the externality tax should be used and a 
transfer made to the exporter in an amount equal the efficiency gain. 
Othenvise, the production/trade tax should be imposed. In practice, this 
contract would not even actually require a report from the exporter. 
Instead, the agreement could simply leave it up to the exporter to 
choose the type of policy and require the importer to transfer the 
efficiency gain to the exporter if it chooses the externality tax. The 
only other detail of the contract is that there may have to be some 
additional transfers, independent of policy, to guarantee that both 
countries are better off than they were prior to the contract, that is, 
to ensure individual rationality.'" Now, if the exporting country chooses 
to impose the externality tax, it will receive its reward but must incur 
the administrative cost associated with the more efficient tax. Thus 
if this cost is greater than its reward, it will stick with the 
productiodtrade tax. Thus the contract is both incentive compatible 
and ex-post efficient. 
While we have set out the terms of the optimal contract, it is not 
at al1 clear that the two countries would ever actually negotiate an 
agreement having these characteristics. The problem is that, under the 
optimal contract and if the externality tax is used, the exporter gets 
to keep the difference between the efficiency gain from the externality 
18) There is a wide range of transfers that wig achieve this. The one that is chosen 
win depend upon the type of bargaining that takes place. We shaii discuss this 
in more detail later. As production taxes, export taxes, and import taxes aii have 
the same effect on aggregate welfare, the distribution of gains rnight be achieved 
(to some degree) by deciding who implements the tax and thereby keeps the tax 
revenue. 
tax and its administrative cost. This is caged an information rent. Each 
country therefore has an incentive to try to alter the contract in such 
a way as to change expected size of the information rent in its favour. 
As an exarnple, suppose the structure of bargaining were such that 
the importer makes a take-it-or- leave-it offer of a contract to the 
exporter. The importer would propose a contract which, while 
individually rational and incentive compatible, would not be ex-post 
efficient. Instead, it would require a transfer from the importer to the 
exporter smaller than the efficiency gain from the externality tax, 
should the latter choose to employ the externality tax. This would have 
the effect of reducing the information rent, but it would also mean that 
the production/trade tax would be used in some instantes where the 
extemality' tax would have been caged for under the optimal contract. 
To this point, we have implicitly assumed that, prior to the 
negotiation of the trade and environmental policy agreement, the 
exporting country did not have an extemality tax already in place. For 
if it did, the importer would merely have to offer the exporter sufficient 
compensation to induce it employ the efficient leve1 of that tax, and 
the question as to the type of tax would be redundant. In such an 
agreement the exporter's information rent would be zero. This 
suggests two things: first, the exporter might want to forgo the 
independent introduction of extemality taxes prior to negotiation, if the 
irnrnediate gain from having them is not too high,'" so as to preserve 
its information rent in the negotiated contract; second, if it does choose 
to forgo externality taxation, that very act may reveal something about 
the size of its administrative cost to the other country. In particular, 
by its putting (or not putting) in place pollution taxes, the exporter 
would signal that the administrative costs were low (or high). In either 
19) It may wish to have them for the reasons indicated in section 111.2. 
CONTINENTAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLlCY 143 
event, some information is revealed, and this revelation reduces the 
available information rent. A smaller information rent means that there 
is less reason for the countries to distort the contract in their 
negotiations. Hence negotiated contracts are likely to be more efficient, 
the greater is the immediate gain to the exporter from having an 
externality tax, as  this increases the information revealed. 
Table 2 
i 
North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation 
Article 1 : Objectives 
The objectives of this Agreement are to: 
(a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the 
territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future 
generations; 
(b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and 
mutually supportive environmental and economic policies; 
(c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, 
and enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna; 
(d) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA; 
(e) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers; 
(f) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of 
environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices; 
(g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws 
and regulations; 
(h) promote transparency and public participation in the development 
of environmental laws, regulations and policies; 
(i) promote economically efficient and effective environmental 
measures; and 
(j) promote pollution prevention policies and practices. 
SOURCE: Government of Canada (1993a) 
IV.1. The Parallel Agreements on Trade and the Environment 
in North America 
How do the combined agreements, for free trade and environmental 
cooperation, compare to what has been suggested by the preceding 
analysis? The stated objectives of the three nations in negotiating the 
environmental side agreement are listed in Table 2. 
From a trade point of view, the benefits of the NAFTA will largely 
fa11 on Mexico, as the smallest country (in the sense of having the 
least monopoly power in trade).m' We suggested above that the benefits 
to larger countries may take the form of concessions of some other 
type, such as the small country's adoption of its partners (more 
restrictive) environmental standards. Indeed, in the NAFTA 
negotiations Mexico agreed to adopt the same high levels of pollution 
abatement as its prospective northern partners. But the NAFTA itself 
had no means of ensuring that the Mexican government would ensure 
that its industries adopted the cleaner, and more expensive, production 
techniques and no mechanism to punish either government or firms 
for not doing so. In this respect, the side agreement makes some 
headway . 
Article 5 of the side agreement states that "each Party shall 
effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through 
appropriate governmental action, subject to Article 37, such as: (a) 
appointing and training inspectors; (b) monitoring compliance and 
investigating suspected violations, including through on-site 
inspections; [ ... l." Article 37 poses a serious constraint on the ability 
of a government to ensure that pollution controls are being used in 
20) Canada had already realised its smal-country trade benefits through the original 
Canada-us Free Trade Agreement. 
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partner countries. It states that nothing in the side agreement "shall 
be construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake 
environmental law enforcement activities in the territory of another 
Party . 
The side agreement does provide private access to remedies, in that 
"interested persons" may request investigations of alleged violations 
of environmental laws and can request that "appropriate action to 
enforce that Party's environmental laws and regulation" be taken. 
Should one of the countries consider that a partner has persistently 
failed to effectively enforce its environmental law then it may take the 
dispute to the Council of the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (under Article 23) which may, if the dispute is still not 
resolved, convene an arbitral panel (under Article 24) which shall: 
"consider the matter where the alleged persistent pattern of failure by the 
Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental law relates 
to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce 
goods or provide services: 
(a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or 
(b) that compete, in the temtory of the Party complained against, with 
goods or services produced or provided by persons of the other 
Party ." 
If the panel determines that there has been a persistent pattem of 
failure to effectively enforce the environmental laws and the disputing 
Parties cannot agree (or have not agreed within the requisite time 
period) to an "'action plan sufficient to remedy the pattern of 
non-enforcement", then a "monetary enforcement assessment" may be 
levied. That is, the polluting government may be fined for not forcing 
its firms to clean up. Should the fine not be paid, a complaining Party 
may suspend (under Article 36) "the application to the Party 
complained against of NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater than 
that sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment." Thus, 
for example, the Us can ensure that the environmental improvements 
that it has bought in exchange for its tariff concessions to Mexico are 
realised, or it can withdraw the trade benefits Mexico gets from the 
deal. Thus NAFTA does have a mechanism to ensure compliance with 
both the trade and environmental obligations of the agreement. 
But what of the choice between using an externality tax and a trade 
restriction to control the pollution? Even if we ignore the problem of 
eliciting information from the polluting country, there are still 
institutional barriers to the selection of the most appropriate pollution 
abatement policy. 
Contracting parties face the GATT 1994 requirement of using the 
least trade-restrictive technical regulation for pollution control. This 
could be inefficient and counterproductive, in harrning the nation it was 
intended to benefit. Thus the tariff would be more trade-restrictive 
and consequently deemed unacceptable but, given sufficiently high 
costs of adrninistering the externality tax, the former could have led 
to higher welfare for the exporting country. We are considering a 
cooperative agreement, the NAFTA, and so the parties are unlikely 
to seek the involvement of the GATT in resolving disputes over the 
terms of the agreement, but it should be noted that GATT constrains 
the freedom of countries in forrning such bilateral agreements. 
Exceptions to the GATT principie of nondiscrimination are allowed 
under Article X XIV which permits the formation of free-trade 
agreements, such as the EU and the NAFTA. In meeting the conditions 
of Article xxiv, nations must have "substantially" free trade by 
elirnination of bilateral tariffs. But this would preclude the countries 
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from agreeing to the imposition of a tariff on exports of firms creating 
the externality, even when such a tariff is the most efficient instrument 
(that is, when administrative cost of the externality tax are high). 
V. GATT AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Now consider the follow question: if a benevolent world planner 
knew today that the two countries would negotiate a trade and 
environmental agreement at a certain point in the future, what trade 
policies would she recommend today? The answer is that if the time 
period until the agreement is reached is not too long, she would 
recommend free trade today. The reason is that, even though it does 
not correct the cross-border extemality, free trade gives the exporter 
the maximum incentive to use an externality tax for terms-of-trade 
purposes and thereby increases the efficiency of the future negotiated 
contract. 
Thus, in application of this theory to the multilateral trading system, 
we find that the GATT, while explicitly renouncing the opportunity 
to be the mechanism for environmental negotiations, can yet have a 
significant impact on the nature of such agreements. If trading nations 
are intent on reaching environmental accords in the near future, then 
the GATT should attempt to have a trade regime that is most 
conducive to efficient environmental agreements. The trade deal should 
be one that creates the strongest private incentive for exporters to use 
externality taxes before the environmental agreement is reached, which 
occurs when trade restrictions are eliminated. The GATT's 
singleminded pursuit of free trade may therefore be a spur to the 
conclusion of efficient multilateral environmental agreements."' 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have exarnined a very specific aspect of the vast research area 
encompassing questions of environmental economics and international 
trade. Our interest has been the inter-relationship between trade policy 
i n s tmen t s  and pollution abatement measures when the goods being 
traded generate cross-border externalities that affect the importing 
country more severely than they hurt the exporter. As a result, the 
country that can directly control the problem has little interest in doing 
so; while the other would want to, but does not have the jurisdiction 
to implement the appropriate first-best policies. 
This topic is of especial interest when the countries decide to form 
a regional trading agreement. First, this type of environmental problem 
is most likely to arise between contiguous countries, which are also 
the strongest candidates as partners in a regiona1,agreement. Secondly, 
a trade agreement limits the ability of an importer to use (second-best) 
trade policy to control the externality, and hence the change in the trade 
regime may have serious environmental implications. But, thirdly, it 
presents the opportunity for the two countries to negotiate a side 
agreement on the environment, parallel to their trade pact. This 
cooperation, #en, might result in the introduction of first-best 
environmental measures, which would not occur when the countries 
act unilaterally. However, optimal policies should not be expected if 
countries have private information regarding some aspect of the 
21) Should a successful conclusion to environmental negotiations be unlikely in the 
near future, then the trade policy must shoulder the responsibility of lirniting 
pollution; in which case free trade is not optirnal and further trade liberalization 
may lower welfare. So the question here is not so much one of whether the same 
body should be responsible for both trade and environmental negotiations but 
whether the discussions can be concluded in close to the same time frame. 
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environmental problem. Such private knowledge enables its holder to 
extract information rent, and efficiency can be lost both in the country's 
attempt to preserve the rent and in its partner's efforts to reduce it. 
We have applied our analysis to case of North American trade and 
econornic integration, in particular the negotiation of the NAFTA. Our 
discussion concluded that the GATT framework has put impediments 
in the path of countries' unilateral attempts at imposing environmental 
laws on traded goods. The NAFTA alone does little to facilitate new 
environmental control measures, save ensuring that the partner 
countries do not lower their standards to attract "dirty" investment. 
With the adoption of the environmental side agreement, some leverage 
is given to countries to ensure that their partners meet their existing 
environmental obligations 
While our primary concern has been with the nature of the 
appropriate regional agreement on trade and environmental policies, 
we recognize that these issues are sometimes negotiated separately 
(for example, the focus of the GATT on purely trade barriers). Our 
research indicates that free trade is indeed an appropriate goal for trade 
talks, if an environmental agreement is anticipated not too far in the 
future. Thus for the advances made by GATT 1994 in trade 
liberalization to be good for the global environment, they have to be 
followed by a multilateral, environmental accord. 
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